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Whither  Money  Demand? 
IN  AN  ARTICLE  IN  THE previous issue of Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, I argued  that uncertainty about the relationship of money demand 
to income is one of the key issues in assessing current monetary policy.' 
The purpose of this report is to discuss this relationship in greater detail. 
I argued in the earlier paper that if the income elasticity of the demand 
for money were less than unity-contrary  to the unitary elasticity assump- 
tion  in the FRB-MIT-Penn model underlying that paper-then  a lower 
rate of monetary growth would be consistent with a vigorous economic 
expansion. For example, the required money growth in those simulations 
averaged about 7 percent in 1970-73 under the assumption of a unitary 
income elasticity of demand. If the income elasticity were 0.85 instead of 
1.0, then the 7 percent figure would be revised to about 6 percent. But a 
fact barely mentioned in the earlier paper-the  high correlation between 
estimates of the income and interest elasticities of the demand for money- 
makes this whole issue of even greater importance than I had recognized.2 
As I shall demonstrate below, one can, using postwar data, support the 
* In addition  to several  members  of the Brookings  panel who made helpful  comments 
on an earlier  draft  of this paper,  I want to thank Barbara  McFadden,  who handled  the 
computer  programming  chores under a severe time constraint.  The views expressed  in 
this paper are the responsibility  solely of the author and do not necessarily  reflect  the 
views of the Division of Research  and Statistics  or of the Board of Governors. 
1. "Gradualism:  A  Mid-Course View," Brookings  Papers on  Economic Activity 
(2:1970), pp. 271-95. 
2. This correlation  must be sharply  distinguished  from the correlation  between in- 
come and interest  elasticity that depends on the definition of the money stock. M2 
(broadly  defined  money)  produces  a higher  estimate  of the income  elasticity  and a lower 
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view that both elasticities  are relatively  high, or both relatively  low, but 
not the view  that one is high and the other  low. 
If the income  elasticity  is indeed  0.85,  then  the interest  elasticity  is lower 
than previously  estimated.  The effect of the lower interest  elasticity  on 
required  monetary  growth  depends  on whether  rates  are rising  or falling. 
When  rates  are falling,  for example,  a lower  interest  elasticity  of demand 
calls  for lower  monetary  growth  because  less money  is absorbed  by declin- 
ing rates. 
In a period  of rising  interest  rates,  the uncertainties  about  the two elastic- 
ities would  be pulling  in opposite  directions,  thereby  reducing  the policy 
uncertainty  concerning  the appropriate  rate of monetary  growth.  But at 
the present  time,  with  interest  rates  falling,  uncertainty  over  the properties 
of the money  demand  function  leads to especially  great  uncertainty  over 
the proper  monetary  policy-defined in terms  of the rate of growth  of the 
money  stock. 
The plan of this report  is first  to examine  estimates  of the income and 
interest  elasticities  in order  to document  the interdependence  of the esti- 
mates  based  upon  postwar  data.  Estimates  relying  on annual  data  for 1929 
through  1969  appear  to be more  reliable  than  estimates  relying  on postwar 
data alone.  These  annual  estimates  suggest  an income  elasticity  of about 
0.85 and a long-term  interest elasticity  of about -0.7.  Following this 
discussion  is an examination  of the effects  of five  different  income  elasticity 
constraints  on the complicated  type of money  demand  function  employed 
in the FRB-MIT-Penn  model. The second section of the paper then 
examines  the question  of whether  the estimates  of the interest  elasticity 
are  generally  biased  in an upward  direction,  quite  apart  from  any bias due 
to the assumption  of too high an income  elasticity.  Neither of two crude 
methods  of approaching  this  issue  suggests  that  there  is any  significant  bias. 
Evidence  on Income  and Interest  Elasticities 
Estimation  of a simple  demand  for money  function  provides  evidence  on 
the sizes of income  and interest  elasticities  and on the relationship  of the 
estimate  of the interest  elasticity  than does the M1  definition  (see note 7 below).  The cor- 
relation  of elasticity  estimates  discussed  here is a function of the statistical  problem  ol 
obtaining  the estimates  and not a function  of the definition  of money.  The M1 definition, 
which  excludes  time deposits,  is used throughout  this report. Whither  Money Demand?  487 
estimates.3  The empirical  work  reported  below  relies  on a simple  demand 
for money function  of the Latane  type,4  which has been found to work 
quite  well over  a long span  of time  and  which  readily  permits  experimenta- 
tion with modified  forms  of the function.  While  Latan6  assumed  that the 
income  elasticity  was unity,  this function  may be easily  modified  to permit 
an estimate  of the income  elasticity  of demand. 
Consider  first  a demand  for money  function  of the form 
(1)  log (p  =log  a + g log ()  +  b log r, 
where 
M = the narrowly  defined  money  stock 
Y =  nominal GNP 
P  =  the GNP deflator 
r = the Aaa corporate  bond yield5 
g = the income  elasticity  of demand 
b =  the interest  elasticity  of demand. 
Since  M/P, Y/P, and  r are  jointly  determined  variables,  there  are  clearly 
econometric  problems  in estimating  equation  (1) through  ordinary  least- 
squares  estimation.  In an effort  to assess  the significance  of the bias from 
this source,  while  adhering  to this method,  several  alternative  forms  of (1) 
have  been  estimated,  which,  it can  be hoped,  will  bracket  the  true  parameter 
values. 
3. All of the empirical  work  in this paper  was performed  on the money  stock series  be- 
fore the extensive  revisions  announced  in late November 1970.  While  the dollar  amounts 
of these  revisions  are largest  for 1970  data, beyond the sample  period used in this paper, 
the revisions  extend back to 1959 and therefore  would affect the empirical  results re- 
ported here  to an unknown  extent. 
4. Henry  A. Latane,  "Cash  Balances  and the Interest  Rate: A Pragmatic  Approach," 
Review of Economics  and Statistics, Vol. 36 (November 1954), pp. 456-60; "Income 
Velocity  and Interest  Rates:  A Pragmatic  Approach,"  Review  of Economics  and  Statistics, 
Vol. 42 (November  1960),  pp. 445-49. 
5. There  are two advantages  to using the Aaa corporate  bond yield. First, and most 
important,  before 1940 U.S. government  securities  were wholly or partially  tax exempt, 
thus requiring  the investigator  to use corporate  securities  to obtain a consistent  interest 
rate series  if data both before  and after 1940  are to be analyzed.  Second, the theoretical 
argument  for using a long-term  interest  rate is that changes  in money-holding  behavior 
are likely to be a result  of changes  in interest  rates  that are expected  to be "permanent" 
rather  than "temporary";  the long-term  interest  rate presumably  better  reflects  longer- 
run expectations  than does the short-term  rate. 488  William  Poole 
Equation  (1) has been  estimated  using  both quarterly  data for the years 
1947-69  and annual  data for the years  1929-69  in the form shown  above 
and a variety  of transformations.  The resulting  estimates  of income and 
interest  elasticities,  as well as the transformations,  are  reported  in Table  1. 
The  (a) equations,  which  delete  the price  level  variable,  have  less  theoretical 
validity  than the others,  but are reported  because  errors  in the GNP de- 
flator  may bias  the other  results. 
Table 1. Alternative  Estimates  of Income  and Interest  Elasticities  of the 
Demand  for Money 
Income  Interest 
Equation  elasticity  elasticity  R2  D W 
Quarterly data, 1947-69 
(1)  0.118  -0.054  0.174  0.062 
(la)  0.337  0.098  0.975  0.085 
(2)  1.572  -  1.275  0.906  0.106 
(2a)  0.493  -0.113  0.975  0.063 
(3)  2.810  -2.564  0.901  0.119 
(3a)  -0.390  1.156  0.928  0.164 
(4)  -0.078  0.111  0.982  0.065 
(4a)  0.258  0.205  0.992  0.115 
Annual data, 1929-69 
(1)  0.845  -0.657  0.955  0.522 
(la)  0.917  -0.652  0.987  0.501 
(2)  0.883  -0.676  0.957  0.528 
(2a)  0.929  -0.663  0.988  0.510 
(3)  0.869  -0.815  0.812  0.520 
(3a)  0.933  -0.824  0.800  0.498 
(4)  0.635  -0.554  0.441  0.175 
(4a)  0.785  -0.523  0.415  0.146 
Source: Derived by the author from equations (1) through (4a) described  below and in the text. Basic data 
are from Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  various issues. See note 3, above. All estimates are based on ordinary  least 
squares. 
(1)  log  (-p  =  log a + glog  -p  + blog  r 
(Y\  loga  1  (M\  b 




+Ilog  )  --  log r 
(3)  log r =  -  log  +  log 
(4)  log  ()  =  lo  a  +  1 I 
log  M  +  1  log r 
Equations (la)-(4a)  correspond to (1)-(4), respectively,  except that the price level variable has been deleted. Whither  Money  Demand?  489 
The most striking  aspect  of these results  is the great variability  of the 
estimates  obtained  from  quarterly  data  for 1947-69  while  the annual  data 
for 1929-69  provide  fairly  consistent  results.6  From the annual  data one 
might conclude  that the income  elasticity  is about  0.85 while  the interest 
elasticity  is about -0.7.7  The interdependence  of the estimates  is clear 
from  both sets of data:  The tendency  is for either  both of the elasticities  to 
be high or both low (in absolute  value). 
The erratic  and in some cases  nonsensical  estimates  from the quarterly 
data press  home an important  lesson.  Using postwar  data alone,  it is im- 
possible  to obtain  a satisfactory  estimate  of the demand  for money func- 
tion. Real income  and nominal  interest  rates have risen almost  continu- 
ously in the postwar  period,  while  the real  stock of money-the narrowly 
defined  money stock divided  by the GNP deflator-has risen only 3.3 
percent over the entire 1947-69 period (0.18 percent compounded  per 
year).  Thus  the postwar  data provide  essentially  no basis for determining 
how much  of the postwar  increase  in velocity  is to be assigned  to the rising 
level  of interest  rates  and  how  much  to an income  elasticity  of less  than  one. 
The iinpossibility  of relying on postwar data alone can be  seen in 
Figure 1, which shows the results,  using quarterly  data for 1947-69, of 
es3timating  the interest  elasticity  with various  constraints  on the income 
elasticity.8  In the figure  the value  of g, the constrained  income  elasticity,  is 
on the horizontal  axis, and on the vertical  axis are two estimates  of the 
interest  elasticity  obtained  from the two ways of running  the regression, 
and  R2,  the measure  of goodness  of fit. A striking  aspect  of these results  is 
that the goodness  of fit is practically  unchanged  over an extremely  wide 
range  of income  elasticities. 
Since  postwar  data  alone  are  unreliable,  it seems  necessary  to give con- 
siderable  weight  to the 1929-69  estimates  in Table  1. As noted above,  these 
estimates  point  to an income  elasticity  of about  0.85. Without  introducing 
6. The use of annual  data for 1947-69 leads to about the same estimates  as does the 
use of quarterly  data for the same period. 
7.  "One  can say that, if the period 1892-1960  is considered,  the elasticity  of demand 
for money  (M2)  with respect  to the short rate of interest  appears  to have varied  between 
roughly -0.12  and -0.15  and, with respect  to the long rate of interest,  between -0.2 
and -0.6.  (If M1 is used instead  the relevant  elasticities  are -0.17  to -0.20  and -0.5 
to -0.8.)"  David E. W. Laidler,  The  Demandfor Money:  Theories  and  Evidence  (Inter- 
national Textbook Co., 1969),  p. 105. 
8. The procedure  used  was to define  a modified  velocity  measure  Z, = (Y/P)8/(M/P), 
and then to regress  log Z0 on log r and log r on log Z0 to provide  two estimates  of the 
interest  velocity. 490  William  Pool 
Figure  1. Effect  of Income  Elasticity  Constraint  on Estimated  Interest 
Elasticity  of the Demand  for Money 
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Source: Based on quarterly  data for 1947-69. Derived by author as described in text and note 8 above. 
Basic data are from Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues. See note 3, above. 
either  alternative  definitions  of the money stock or dynamic considera- 
tions, these estimates  are probably  about as reliable  as any that can be 
obtained  at the present  time. It would,  of course,  be desirable  to examine 
an  even  longer  time  period,  but  the national  income  statistics  are  not nearly 
as reliable  before  1929  as after  that year.  Confidence  in these estimates  is 
strengthened  by the fact  that, over  the 1929-69  period  as a whole,  fluctua- 
tions  in interest  rates  are  large  relative  to trend,  whereas  the reverse  is true Whither  Money Demand?  491 
in the 1947-69 period. Furthermore,  the 1929-69 period covers an ex- 
traordinarily  wide range  of experience:  Depression  and wartime  inflation 
both occur in this sample  period.  Figure 1 demonstrates  that when the 
income elasticity  is constrained  to equal  0.9, the estimate  of the interest 
elasticity  using  postwar  data  is very  similar  to-though perhaps  a bit higher 
than-the  estimate  using  annual  data  for 1929-69. 
What  faces  the  investigator,  then,  is the absolute  necessity  of relying  on a 
priori  restrictions  if postwar  quarterly  data are  to be used.  An example  of 
such an approach  is the money demand  function  in the FRB-MIT-Penn 
model. In the model  the a priori  restriction  involves  constraining  the in- 
come elasticity  to be unity,  and  then estimating  the dynamics  and interest 
elasticity  under  this constraint. 
Given  the results  above  based  on a simple  Latan6  type  of money  demand 
function, one can explore  the effects of different  income elasticity  con- 
straints  on the demand  for money function  used in the FRB-MIT-Penn 
model.  The structure  underlying  this money  demand  function  involves  the 
standard  stock-adjustment  model.9 
The estimates  of the coefficients  of the demand  for demand  deposits  are 
reported  in Table  2 for various  income  elasticity  constraints.  (Currency  de- 
mand  is a simple  function  of nominal  personal  consumption  expenditures 
and the interest  rate  on passbook  savings  accounts  in commercial  banks.) 
The coefficient  estimates  of equation  (6) for income elasticity  g of 1.0, 
shown in Table 2, are essentially  those used for the demand deposits 
equation  in the model simulations  in my earlier  paper, apart  from some 
minor  differences  due to data revisions. 
The results  are clearly  very similar  to those in Table 1. The lower the 
income  elasticity  constraint,  the lower  (in absolute  value)  are  the elasticities 
for the bill rate  and  time deposit  rate. 
9.  The two equations in the stock-adjustment  model  are: 
log (-)  =  log a +  g log (-)  +  bi log  rB  +  b2 log  rT  +  b3 A log  rD 
log  (D)  =  log  (Lpi)  +  {log  (D)  -log  (Dp1)] 
An asterisk indicates the desired stock,  rB is the three-month Treasury bill rate, rT is the 
average rate on commercial bank passbook  savings accounts,  rD is the Federal Reserve 
discount  rate, D is demand deposits,  Y is GNP,  and P is the GNP  deflator. These two 
equations  may be solved  to obtain equations  (5) and (6), shown  in Table  2. 0  enoo r  #  r  0o  o  t  D  "t  t 
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If it is assumed that in the long run the time deposit rate is some (possibly 
fractional) multiple of the bill rate, then the elasticities for the time deposit 
rate and bill rate may be added to  obtain a total interest elasticity. For 
equations (5) and (6), respectively,  this total elasticity for g  1.0 is -0.397 
and -0.454,  while for g =  0.8 the figures are -0.316  and -0.353.  These 
elasticities are lower than those reported above for the Aaa corporate bond 
yield, but since short-term interest rates fluctuate far more than long-term 
interest rates, this result should be expected. The coefficient on the change 
in the discount rate is not of great importance since it is the change and not 
the level of the discount rate that enters the regression. In this formulation, 
therefore, a change in the discount rate has an impact effect but no per- 
manent effect. 
Further  Analysis  of the Interest  Elasticity 
How much  upward  bias in the estimated  interest  elasticity  results  from 
this formulation of the demand for money function? An interest elasticity 
that is in fact near zero has three important implications: (1) Such factors 
as fiscal policy, investment anticipations, and consumer confidence will 
have essentially no impact on national income; given the money supply, 
changes in these factors will merely shift the composition of the gross na- 
tional product. (2) The income elasticity will probably also be below previ- 
ous estimates, and if it is as low as, say, 0.6, then the long-run norm for 
monetary growth will be 3 percent or less, rather than the 4 to 5 percent 
now widely accepted. (3) If the demand for money function is stable, a 
sustained growth in the money stock at a 5 to 6 percent annual rate will 
mean vigorous, and perhaps inflationary, economic expansion. 
An upward bias in the estimated interest elasticity could stem from the 
implicit assumption  in all of the equations discussed above that the interest 
rate paid on demand deposits is zero. Given this assumption, the market 
rate of interest in the demand function correctly measures the opportunity 
cost of holding demand deposits with zero yield. 
While explicit interest on demand deposits is forbidden by law, service 
charges, which amount to negative interest, are permitted. Furthermore, 
implicit interest, which is of greater  importance, may be paid in any number 
of  forms:  preferential loan terms for  depositors, the  construction of  a 494  William  Poole 
larger number of banks and bank branches, and longer banking hours- 
the  last  two  providing a  yield  in  convenience. Fluctuations  in  service 
charges and in implicit interest are to  be expected, and would probably 
reflect fluctuations in market rates of interest. Thus the spread between 
market rates and implicit deposit rates has probably not changed as much 
as market rates alone. If it has not changed at all, then the interest elasticity 
estimated above is entirely spurious. 
While presumably no one would quarrel with this general analysis, the 
size of the effects remains an issue of great importance. But since implicit 
interest may be paid in a variety of ways, most of which are not susceptible 
to precise measurement, it is extremely difficult to obtain evidence on its 
significance and in turn on  any bias it introduces into estimates of the 
interest elasticity. In the absence of a series on implicit deposit interest 
rates, the problem must be approached indirectly. The two types of in- 
direct evidence examined in this section are offered in the belief that some 
evidence, however tentative, is better than none. 
The first approach is based on the observation, documented in the first 
section of this paper and by many other investigators, that interest rates 
consistently are found to be significant in explaining money demand. But 
is it possible that the interest rate variable does not genuinely belong in the 
money demand function, but rather is serving as a proxy, systematically 
picking up the effects of variables that ought to be included, but are not? 
If so, what are these other effects? The major argument would have to be 
that these other effects  involve the dynamics of the money demand function. 
The construction of a complete theoretical argument to explain how the 
dynamics of the money demand function could lead to spurious estimates 
of the interest elasticity is well beyond the scope of this paper. But one 
conceivable argument can be sketched out in general terms. Suppose, for 
example, that the demand for money is independent of interest rates but 
depends on current and lagged income, such that the elasticity with respect 
to current income alone is less than the total income elasticity. In such a 
world, if the rate of growth of the money stock jumps suddenly, income 
must  initially jump  especially sharply to  generate the  required money 
demand. But the sharp  jump in income represents a business boom and so 
interest rates are pushed up  by the heavy borrowing that typically ac- 
companies a boom. The simultaneous increases in real income, velocity, 
and interest rates that typically occur in a period of rapid business expan- 
sion would then be explained without resort to a significant interest elas- Whither  Money Demand?  495 
ticity in the demand for money function.10  If this argument is correct, then 
lags in the demand for money function are the missing factors whose effects 
are being picked up by the interest rate in the equations above. And once 
the missing factors are successfully accounted for, the interest rate variable 
should  have no  further role to  play-that  is,  its  regression  coefficient 
should be driven down to zero. 
This line of reasoning is the basis for the following crude test. Suppose 
lagged money terms are introduced into the money-income function, since 
the lagged income terms in this function depend in turn on lagged values 
of the money stock. Then, if the estimated interest elasticity is merely pick- 
ing up the dynamics of the money demand function, the inclusion of the 
lagged money terms should reduce the estimated interest rate coefficient. 
Indeed, to the extent that changes in the money stock are the major cause 
of  income fluctuations, the inclusion of  lagged terms should reduce the 
regression coefficient  of the interest rate even though it really belongs in the 
demand for money function. 
Table 3, using annual data from 1933 to 1969, shows the results of adding 
lagged money stock variables. No evidence develops of a significant reduc- 
tion in the regression coefficient of the Aaa corporate bond yield in regres- 
sions of income on the bond yield and current and lagged money. From 
this evidence, if the interest elasticity of the demand for money is indeed 
much smaller than the estimates, some other mechanism must be at work. 
The foregoing is the first method of searching indirectly for evidence of 
the importance of implicit interest in the demand for money function-an 
examination of the implications for relationships among income, money, 
and interest on  the  assumption that  it  is,  in  fact,  significant. Another 
method of testing for implicit interest is to  analyze the likely effects on 
bank earnings of its presence or absence. In its absence, bank earnings 
should rise and fall as market interest rates rise and fall. This matter is not 
easy to investigate because of both data and conceptual problems. Never- 
theless, a crude analysis of bank earnings in the 1965-69 period of rapidly 
rising interest rates is attempted; its results are shown in Table 4. 
Row (1) shows the change in the annual average of three-month Treasury 
bill rates since 1964, and row (2), demand deposits for December of each 
preceding year. The assumption is that the banks can earn the increased 
10. This argument  is basically  of the same type as that presented  in Milton Friedman, 
"The Demand  for Money:  Some  Theoretical  and Empirical  Results,"  Journial  of Political 
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interest of row (1) when lending out these deposits. These extra earnings 
are shown in row (3), with the assumption that about 85 percent of the 
demand deposits are available for lending, while roughly 15 percent must 
be held as reserves. Rows (4), (5), and (6) provide similar figures for time 
deposits. Large certificates  of deposit (CDs) are excluded from this calcula- 
tion  on the grounds that they are competitive with other money market 
instruments so that banks do  not earn excess profits on them. Interest 
ceilings on CDs are assumed not to be effective since CDs apparently run 
off quickly when their ceiling rate is below  other money market rates. 
Row (7) is the sum of the calculated bonus to banks from higher interest 
rates. 
Rows (8) and (9) provide two measures of the change in bank earnings 
since 1964. The figures  in row (8) are probably more appropriate  than those 
in row (9) since the latter include capital gains and losses on security sales 
and provisions for loan losses that generally exceed actual losses. Row (10) 
reports an attempt to  allow for the fact that, without inflation, earnings 
would have risen even more than indicated by rows (8) and (9). Row (10) 
was calculated by multiplying the noninterest expenses of banks in 1964 
by the percentage  increase in the GNP deflator since 1964. Some allowance 
of this type is clearly necessary since cost inflation tends to reduce earnings 
below what would otherwise be the case.11 
From row (7) and row (11) it can be seen that bank earnings have been 
somewhat below what would have been expected if the prohibition of in- 
terest on  demand deposits  and the  ceiling on  time  deposits were fully 
effective. Yet the difference between row (7) and row (11) is not so large 
as to  suggest that implicit interest is paid to  a significant extent in the 
short run. 
This analysis of bank earnings is at best rough and ready, but it makes 
clear that bank earnings expanded dramatically in the late  1960s, indi- 
11. In principle,  however,  an allowance  working  in the other direction  is also needed 
since,  even  without  an increase  in market  interest  rates,  bank  earnings  would  presumably 
have grown  over  this period  as deposits  grew.  It might  be assumed  that banks  would  earn 
the same  profits  per  additional  dollar  of deposits  added  after 1964  as they  earned  in that 
year.  But without  separate  estimates  of the profitability  of demand  and time deposits  this 
calculation  cannot  be made.  Even if the appropriate  figures  were  known,  this adjustment 
is suspect  since banks' marginal  profit  rate is probably  below their average  profit  rate. 
Indeed,  in the period  1960-63,  when  interest  rates  were  essentially  unchanged,  bank  earn- 
ings were  also essentially  unchanged  even though there was substantial  deposit growth. 
For the bank  earnings  data, 1960-68,  see Aninual  Report  of the Federal  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation,  1968, Table 112. Whither  Money  Demand?  499 
cating that the prohibition of interest on demand deposits and the regula- 
tion of interest rates on time deposits is at least partially effective. 
These results suggest that, to the extent implicit interest is paid, its rate 
is only a fraction of the market rate. It can be shown that if implicit interest 
is paid in such a way that the implicit interest rate is a constant fraction of 
the market interest rate-for  example, implicit interest is 1 percent when 
market interest is 4 percent, 2 percent when market interest is 8 percent, 
and so forth-then  failure to put the implicit deposit rate into the regres- 
sions does not lead to a bias in the estimated interest elasticity.'2 In this 
case the market interest rate alone is a satisfactory index of the spread 
between the market rate and the implicit deposit rate. 
Both pieces of indirect evidence examined in this section point in the 
same direction. If implicit interest is paid to any significant extent, its rate 
may well be a roughly constant fraction of the market interest rate. If this 
argument is correct, then there is no reason to believe that the estimates of 
the interest elasticity presented above are biased in any particular  direction. 
Summary  and  Conclusions 
This paper began with the observation that the nature of the demand for 
money function is likely to  be of great importance for monetary policy 
over the next few years. Considerable uncertainty surrounds the income 
and interest elasticities of demand, and in a period of falling interest rates, 
greatly amplifies  uncertainty  over the appropriate  rate of monetary growth. 
On the basis of the admittedly crude evidence reported in this paper, it 
would  appear that both income and interest elasticities may be  a little 
below those assumed in the simulations reported in my earlier paper. This 
conclusion implies that the required rates of money growth will be some- 
what lower than the previous analysis indicated. 
But the tenuous nature of this conclusion should not be forgotten. One 
might argue, as I would not, that data prior to  1947, or even 1950, are of 
12. Suppose  the interest  rate term in the demand  for money function  has the form b 
log (rM -  rD), where b is the interest elasticity and rM  and rD  are the market and deposit 
interest  rates,  respectively.  Then, if rD=  arM, where a is a constant, b log (rM -  rD)  = 
b log (1 -  a) +  b log rM.  But this expression  is exactly  the form used in the regressions, 
since b log (1 -  a) is simply  a constant,  which  ends up as part of the total constant  term 
of the regression. 500  William Poole 
questionable relevance to the current situation; but there is essentially no 
possibility of reliably estimating the income and interest elasticities on the 
basis of postwar data alone. The additional year of data that will be avail- 
able a year from now may provide far more information than one would 
ordinarily expect from only one more year of data, especially if short-term 
interest rates remain near or below current levels and long-term rates con- 
tinue to decline. In this situation, special care in updating estimates of the 
demand for money function would seem to be fully warranted. 
Discussion 
WARREN  SMITH  SUGGESTED  that William Poole's  results in the  report 
had an important  bearing on the arguments  for a money-oriented monetary 
policy that Poole had developed in earlier work. The case for money being 
superior to interest rates as a policy target rests on the proposition that the 
financial sector of the economy is better understood than the real sector. 
That is a shaky argument, and Poole's empirical findings help to show the 
large extent of our uncertainty about what the demand for;money is and 
how it behaves. The Poole paper thus reinforced Smith's preference for 
interest rate targets in the formulation of monetary policy. In addition, 
Smith pointed out, the argument for the money stock as a target assumes 
that changes in monetary  policy are sufficiently  infrequent  to enable changes 
in interest rates during the intervals between policy adjustments to exert a 
significant  stabilizing  effect on economic activity. In a regime in which open 
market policy is made every three weeks, this is surely not the case. Franco 
Modigliani felt that Smith's case for an interest rate target is very sensible 
in a period in which changes in price expectations are not important. But 
in periods when price expectations are strongly responsive to current price 
performance, more attention must be paid to monetary aggregates. Look- 
ing  at nominal interest rates alone,  one could be seriously misled. For 
example, if it turns out that observed interest rates are higher than ex- 
pected, but prices are also rising faster than expected, real interest rates 
may be lower. 
Barry Bosworth found it hard to believe that price expectations are as 
volatile in the short run as Modigliani had implied. To  Bosworth, the Whither  Money  Demand?  501 
short-run  movements  in nominal  interest  rates must represent  primarily 
movements  in the real  rate  of interest,  rather  than changes  in price  expec- 
tations. Smith agreed with Modigliani that inflationary  expectations 
created  problems  in conducting  monetary  policy,  but he was skeptical  that 
these could be avoided  by choosing  monetary  aggregates  as targets.  Pre- 
sumably,  changing  price  expectations  will shift  the demand  for  money  and 
other liquid assets.  Both Modigliani  and Poole saw no evidence  that the 
demand  for money (in the narrow  sense) is directly  influenced  by price 
expectations;  that is, nominal  interest  rates  belong  in the money demand 
functions. 
Poole stressed  that the uncertainties  about financial  and real relation- 
ships  were  a relative  matter.  He considered  our uncertainties  about  invest- 
ment demand to be far greater  than those relating  to money demand. 
Poole agreed  with Smith  that interest  rates  must not be ignored.  But he 
argued: "Generally,  I would interpret  an unexpected  decline  in interest 
rates  primarily  as evidence  that demand  in the real sector  is weaker  than 
anticipated  rather  than that monetary  policy has become more expan- 
sionary." 